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1. Introduction 
Should we bring about a radically egalitarian (or socialist) society in which everyone has 
extensive and equal access to what they need to lead a flourishing life? Any conception of social 
justice like this, animated by ambitious principles, faces the common worry that what it 
prescribes is unrealistic. There are at least three kinds of response to this worry. The first is to 
make the normative principles of the conception less ambitious and thus more practicable. The 
second is to dismiss practical concerns about feasibility as irrelevant to the truth of theoretical 
claims about what justice demands. These responses face further challenges. The first risks 
surrendering in the face of a morally rotten status quo, and the second fails to illuminate the 
relation between principles of justice and their fulfillment in the real world. Although I address 
ways in which these first two strategies could be defended against these challenges,1 in this paper 
I focus on the constructive task of developing a third strategy that combines normative ambition 
and feasibility. I propose a dynamic approach to the relation between justice and feasibility. 
Some feasibility constraints are “soft” rather than “hard”: they are malleable over time (e.g. 
several cultural, political, and economic mechanisms are soft, while logic and physical laws, 
when true, are hard). When demanding principles clash with soft rather than hard constraints, an 
appropriate response may be one that neither deems the principles null nor disengages feasibility 
considerations. We can use our political imagination to envisage alternative ways to fulfill 
principles in different contexts, and recognize dynamic duties to expand our ability to fulfill 
                                                      
1 Defenders of the first strategy can say that their focus is only on what to do here and now; defenders of the second 
strategy can say that their focus is not on what to do, but on the truth of fundamental normative principles. See, 
respectively, Sen 2009 and Cohen 2008, and responses in Gilabert 2012a and Gilabert 2011. For the debate about 
ideal and nonideal theory see Valentini 2012. 
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those principles over time. We can thus retain idealism about principles and realism about 
feasibility and combine them in a way that is practically consequential.  
  I have identified some scattered elements of this approach in previous work. 2  Besides 
identifying elements missed before, in this paper I present a systematic articulation of the 
approach, and illuminate its significance for the development and defense of ambitious 
conceptions of justice. In section 2, I explain what feasibility is, why we should care about it, and 
how we should take it into account when developing normative judgments. In section 3, I 
propose the dynamic approach to the pursuit of justice, which is focused on the importance of 
political imagination and the expansion of agents’ power to realize ambitious normative 
principles. This paper presents a program. It offers a conceptual framework to think about the 
relation between justice and feasibility and a substantive approach to normative problems 
concerning that relation. Inevitably, some details regarding the issues addressed will not be fully 
settled. But I hope that this deficiency is offset by the novelty and fruitfulness of the account 
proposed. Despite the importance of the topic for political philosophy, there is to my knowledge 
no other similarly systematic account of the relation between justice and feasibility. 
 
2. The nature, importance, and role of feasibility 
In this section I explain how considerations of feasibility should be incorporated into our 
normative deliberations. I propose a framework to guide a form of inquiry that is practical. It is 
concerned with shaping how we choose to act in the social world. I anchor my exploration in the 
deliberative stance of agents. 3  I organize my exposition by addressing the following three 
                                                      
2 Gilabert 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012. 
3 I assume throughout that moral reasons are normatively dominant in our deliberation about what to do, so that we 
never have conclusive reason to do what we have conclusive moral reason not to do, and if we have conclusive 
moral reason to do something that is the thing for us to do. Furthermore, I concentrate on reasons of social justice, 
which are central in politics, but what I say could be couched in more general moral terms. 
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The expression “… is feasible” is often used when considering political processes involving 
individual or collective agents seeking to bring about certain outcomes or states of affairs in 
certain circumstances. It is used to address the issues whether, and to what extent, the agents in 
the circumstances have the ability or power to bring about the outcomes they might seek.4 Thus, 
feasibility is a relational concept of power or ability that connects three basic elements: an agent, 
certain outcomes, and certain circumstances. A schema to articulate this concept is the following. 
An agent A has the power to bring about an outcome O in circumstances C if and only if O 
would occur if A tries, in C, to bring it about (and A can indeed try). When we consider specific 
processes, it is often useful to break down the variable for outcomes into several components. 
Three such components are (i) the agent’s deciding to act; (ii) the agent’s acting; and (iii) the 
action’s producing the desired consequences. Thus, when we consider the feasibility of a group 
of workers obtaining a salary raise by means of strike action we explore the ability of various 
workers who support the strike action to form the intention to strike, to initiate and continue the 
strike action throughout the appropriate period of time, and to obtain through their actions the 
concessions from managers they were aiming at. 
 As in previous formulations, I understand feasibility claims as involving a conditional: they 
say what would happen if agents take certain initiatives.5 But I now emphasize that this account 
should be phrased more carefully to include a complex view of outcomes and the assertion that 
                                                      
4 In this paper I use the terms “ability,” “power,” and “capacity” interchangeably. 
5 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012. Brennan and Southwood 2007 proposed the conditional approach. I am not 
assuming that feasibility can only be analyzed in this way. 
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agents can take the relevant initiatives. This ensures that various important issues are not 
rendered invisible. Thus, there may be feasibility issues regarding the aspects (i)-(iii) mentioned 
in the previous paragraph. To show that certain desired consequences are feasible for an agent to 
produce it may not be enough to show that the agent would produce them if they engaged in the 
relevant actions. One may also have to show that the agent has the power to engage in such 
actions. Furthermore, to show that performing certain actions is feasible for an agent it may not 
be enough to show that they would perform them if they decided to do so. One may also have to 
show that the agents would be able to form the decision to act and sustain the intention to act 
through the duration of the relevant actions. There are at least three points of discussion about 
the feasibility of agents’ bringing about certain outcomes, concerning whether the agents are able 
to produce what is mentioned in (i), (ii), and (iii).  
 Not noticing this complexity makes our moral judgments and our political deliberations 
poorer, as these often rely on assumptions about what agents are able to achieve regarding (i) and 
(ii) besides (iii). Here are two examples. We should hesitate to say that it is feasible for Pedro to 
brush aside the spider that is on the table and is about to attack his helpless friend if his 
arachnophobia would make him unable to form the decision to engage in the close contact with 
the spider that is necessary to brush it aside, even if he would easily brush aside the spider if he 
did decide to approach it. If Peter should save his friend, he might do better by asking for 
assistance from someone else. The challenges the workers face to get their salary raise once 
striking may be importantly different form the challenges they face when seeking to get their 
collective action of striking off the ground. Particular workers may find these challenges to be of 
different levels of difficulty. John may find it hard to bargain well with management (e.g. to 
express himself boldly and compellingly), and Maria may find it hard to join the strike (e.g. to 
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overcome her tendency to free ride). John and Maria may still be able to do what is so hard for 
them, but the degree of feasibility of doing it is affected by the psychological phenomena 
mentioned. Surely these considerations matter as strike action is planned. 6 
 Feasibility claims often have this form: “A (an individual or collective agent) has the power to 
bring about O (a certain outcome—possibly quite complex, as in (i)-(iii) above—in 
circumstances C.” This formulation takes feasibility to allow (like possibility) for presence or 
absence but not degrees. Now, there is a sense of feasibility that is indeed binary. It sharply says 
that an agent is able (or unable) to achieve something in certain circumstances. But we also need 
to capture another sense of feasibility that is scalar. This sense is not an “on/off” one, but is 
graded. Claims of scalar feasibility have this form: “A has the power to bring about O in 
circumstances C to the degree, or with probability, P.” 
 Both senses are relevant for moral and political deliberation. The binary sense is used to 
conclusively rule out certain outcomes. Feasibility parameters involved here concern, for 
example, laws of logic and nature. When true, these laws impose hard constraints. The strikers 
                                                      
6 Estlund 2011 considers whether there are any motivational constraints on requirements of justice. He accepts for 
the sake of argument that “ought” implies “can do” but explores, and rejects, the different view that “ought” implies 
“can will.” He claims that there are cases in which an agent ought to do something even if they cannot will to do it. 
Even if some people are so selfish that they cannot bring themselves to avoid littering when this costs them some 
extra effort, we think that they ought to do it and do not take their motivational incapacity to block the requirement 
(pp. 219-20). 
 A problem with Estlund’s argument is that the examples he picks are not intuitively clear cases in which an agent 
“can’t will” to do something. The littering case seems instead to involve a prediction that the agent “won’t will” 
or/and “won’t do” something, which is not obviously requirement blocking. Estlund puts aside what he calls 
“clinical cases” (involving phobias and other powerful psychological mechanisms—p. 219). But these are the most 
promising examples of “can’t will.” And he allows that they may block requirements. The cases Estlund focuses on 
(concerning selfish tendencies) do not seem genuine cases of incapacity but rather cases where willing to do 
something is hard or unlikely, and so they do not provide a clear counterexample to the claim that “ought” implies 
“can will,” and when he does consider better candidates for motivational incapacities (as in the case of phobias) he 
allows that they may block requirements (thus potentially confirming rather than challenging the claim). 
 A deeper problem is that it is not clear that accepting that “ought to do” implies “can do” is consistent with 
denying that “ought to do” implies “can will to do,” as Estlund hopes (p. 213). The problem is that “can do” seems 
to imply “can will to do” if the doing we focus on is intentional. Intentional action is indeed the focus of Estlund’s 
discussion (see note 9 below). If the agent cannot will to do something, they cannot intentionally do it.  Regarding 
intentional actions, “ought to do” implies “can will to do” if “ought to do” implies “can do,” because “can do” 
implies “can will to do.” 
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cannot succeed if they aim at securing for all workers in a nation at time t1 a salary higher than 
the average salary for workers in the nation at t1. The scalar sense engages different feasibility 
parameters. They are soft constraints involving, for example, various economic, political, and 
cultural mechanisms. These are soft because they are not inviolable. They affect instead the 
probability of success of the pursuit of certain outcomes. Labor activists are more likely to 
unionize workers in a country where there is a strong solidaristic political culture than in a 
country where competitive individualism is rampant even if they are not, strictly speaking, 
incapable of reaching high-levels of unionization in either context. The previous example 
concerning John and Maria also engages scalar feasibility. Despite its great importance 
(discussed below), the scalar sense of feasibility has been neglected in political philosophy. As a 
result, feasibility claims are often phrased in binary terms when they should instead be graded.7 
 
2.2. Why? 
In what circumstances, for what purposes, do we talk about feasibility? Different occasions and 
aims might affect the account of feasibility we go on to develop. Here I focus on issues of 
justice, and on shaping our normative political reasoning regarding how we should act. 
 We have, I think, the twin intuitions that we should be weary of both naive idealism and 
conservative realism. The first surfaces when we pursue outcomes that are desirable but whose 
feasibility is extremely low, and the latter surfaces when we surrender to a morally rotten status 
quo, taking as fixed what we could change through lucid action. Political history is full of 
examples of both failed voluntaristic radical strategies and successful revolutionary changes. 
These intuitions are important aspects of a desideratum of ethical responsibility and serious care 
                                                      
7 The scalar sense is introduced in Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012; Gilabert 2012b: chs. 4 and 7; Lawford-Smith 
2013. Although I think it is most fruitful to leave soft constraints for scalar treatment, some construe binary 
feasibility so as to include them (characterizing outcomes as infeasible if the probability that agents would produce 
them if they try is below some threshold). See Wiens 2015.  
 7 
for what we bring about (or do not prevent) through our actions (or omissions). To honor these 
intuitions, to make ethically responsible choices, we should use feasibility considerations that 
include both the binary and scalar forms. 
 Binary feasibility claims can be deployed through the familiar “ought implies can” principle. 8 
When we are unable to produce a certain outcome, we take any requirement to produce it to be 
null. This helps us engage the worry about naïve idealism. It may also help us engage the worry 
about conservative realism. We can refuse to automatically drop the search for outcomes that are 
hard, but not such that we are strictly speaking unable to get. The use of scalar feasibility deploys 
a more diffuse, “feasibility affects all-things-considered choices” principle. It engages the 
worries about naive idealism and conservative realism in further, more complex ways. 
 Since the force of binary feasibility is obvious, I will say more about the use of scalar 
feasibility claims in the responsible generation of all-things-considered choices. This is a crucial 
area of normative reasoning. Scalar feasibility is important because practical deliberation often 
involves comparative assessment of strategies on account of their prospects for success. The 
strikers wonder whether to ask for a 20% raise or a 10% raise. None of the final outcomes (the 
raises) may be impossible to achieve, but the probability of success may be different. And this 
may have normative significance. Imagine that the probability of getting the 20% raise is very 
low and the probability of getting the 10 % raise is very high. If the workers suffer severe 
economic deprivation, then knowing these probabilities would support a choice of settling for a 
10% raise. If their situation were not onerous, taking the risks and going for 20% might be less 
problematic. In both cases the higher raise is in itself the more desirable outcome. But the 
probabilities of success are also important in deciding what to choose. 
                                                      
8 I do not challenge this principle here. For the debates see Vranas 2007. Southwood 2016 argues that deliberation 
about what to do is constrained by what can be done. 
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 Consider another example. Celeste is the leader of a political party. She has great political 
talent and experience, and she is committed to the best views about social justice. She has been 
the leader for a very long time. She is now considering whether to step down. If she does, Delia 
will become the new leader. Delia has the same commitments to justice. But she is less talented 
than Celeste. If they performed at their best, Celeste would help advance social justice more than 
Delia. However, given her long tenure in a position of power and certain psychological 
weaknesses, Celeste justifiably fears that she is far more liable to become corrupt than Delia, and 
thus to end up advancing the cause of social justice less. To make her choice, Celeste has reason 
to consider not only what she and Delia can do in a binary sense, but also the extent to which, in 
a scalar sense, each is likely to succeed at fulfilling the ideals they cherish as party leaders. 
 Conflict with hard constraints renders a putative duty of justice infeasible, and makes its 
prescriptive force null. Conflict with soft constraints renders a putative duty less feasible to 
fulfill than it would otherwise be, and might make a dent on its prescriptive force. When we 
consider soft constraints and scalar feasibility, our question is not whether normative 
requirements are blocked. We move beyond the application of “ought implies can.” Our question 
is how, if at all, the probabilities of success in fulfilling various normative ideals if we take 
various initiatives to do so should bear on our choices about what to do. To avoid naive idealism, 
we may sometimes have to avoid paths of action that that have low probability of success. To 
avoid conservative realism, we may sometimes have to pursue those very same paths. Soft 
constraints are real, and they can be overcome. Responsible choice turns on weighing the 
importance of both points in the relevant circumstances.  
 To engage in responsible choice, it is important to resist the temptation of imposing fixed 
thresholds on scalar feasibility assessments to turn them into binary ones. This would be a bad 
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idea as a general conceptual policy. The problem, from a deliberative standpoint, is that it would 
disable some fine-grained comparative assessments we need to make when choosing between 
options that are above or below the threshold. Thus, two options that are above the threshold 
would count as binary feasible, but we would not focus on whether one is more feasible than the 
other. However, this is something we have reason to do to choose lucidly between them (e.g. to 
avoid wasting resources that could be used in valuable ways).  
 Some might want to use a binary idea of feasibility to apply the principle that “ought implies 
can” in a way that captures a certain view of agents’ abilities. For example, they might recognize 
that the concept of ability is different from that of possibility, but characterize ability in binary 
terms as an agent’s tendency to succeed at producing the outcome they seek to produce.9 A 
tendency to succeed could be characterized by referring to what is at or above some threshold of 
probability. Now, I think that we should handle this suggestion with care. Sometimes it may be 
possible for someone to do something even if they are not able to do it (in the binary senses of 
possibility as not violating hard constraints and of ability as having a tendency to succeed given 
hard and soft constraints). It is important to consider such cases because some obligations may 
exist in them. Imagine that a psychopath tells me, “I will kill your son unless you draw a jack of 
hearts from this shuffled deck in a single draw.” If the threat is credible and my only relevant 
options are to pick a card or not to pick one, that there is a possibility but not a tendency that I 
will draw the jack of hearts when picking a card might make a claim that I have an obligation to 
                                                      
9 E.g., “A person is able to (can) do something if and only if, were she to try and not give up, she would tend to 
succeed.” On this view, ability is different from mere possibility. It would be possible for someone to draw a jack of 
hearts from a shuffled deck in a single draw, although we would not say that they are able to do so (Estlund 2011: 
212). For further discussion on probability thresholds see Gilabert 2012b: sect. 7.6. For exploration of different 
levels of ability (involving differences in the extent to which agents have control over outcomes), see Mele 2003. 
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draw a jack of hearts awkward, but would not block my obligation to try by picking a card. 
Extremely low probability below the threshold may keep some obligations running.10 
 
2.3. How? 
How should we incorporate considerations of feasibility into a conception of justice? I will 
propose a general strategy in the next section. Here I introduce two key distinctions that will 
enable that strategy. The first is the distinction between evaluative and prescriptive judgments. 
As I construe the distinction here, both components make claims about what ought to be done, 
but they differ in how they handle feasibility conditions because they answer different questions. 
Schematically, and respectively, the questions are the following: “Ought I to bring about O if it is 
feasible for me to do so?” “Ought I to bring about O given the actual feasibility constraints I 
currently face?”11 
                                                      
10 Alternatively, the notion of ability may be characterized contextually, with thresholds of “tendency to succeed” 
varying on the basis of various considerations, including value-based ones (e.g. imposing lower thresholds when the 
stakes are high). But this would involve a mixed concept of feasibility that smuggles desirability considerations. It is 
better to keep the notions of feasibility and ability descriptive rather than normative, to include a scalar dimension, 
and to see the combination with value-based considerations as a separate exercise to be undertaken explicitly in 
ways appropriate to the context at hand. 
11 My characterizations are stipulative, and not meant to grasp the wealth of ordinary usage. The key difference 
between the evaluative and the prescriptive concerns how they relate to feasibility. But consistent with that 
difference, the evaluative can be construed in various ways. I focus on evaluative claims that range over what one 
ought to do, and in particular on “oughts” of justice. Notice that these need not have a consequentialist form. They 
can also include pro tanto deontological norms. 
 I introduced the distinction in Gilabert 2011 to articulate and discuss Gerald Cohen’s views, especially his claim 
that there can be requirements of justice that are infeasible. Although I agree that evaluative judgments are crucial, I 
do not share Cohen’s downplaying of prescriptive judgments in political philosophy. Cohen underestimates the task 
of identifying what he calls “rules of regulation” (which derive from ultimate, fact-insensitive principles of justice 
together with facts and/or values other than justice). Such rules are often not something we “adopt” in a weak sense 
that involves their being “optional” (Cohen 2008: 265-7, 277). The search for the right rules to “adopt” may be as 
strict as the search for the fundamental principles to “believe” (there may be some that we have most reason to 
follow in contrast with others).  It is, in any case, central for political philosophy. And so is to illuminate judgments 
of articulation that move from general and hypothetical statements about what ought to be done to specific and 
categorical ones about what some people ought to do in certain circumstances. The move involves substantive 
claims that come intertwined with descriptions and evaluations of various facts, and is not a mere exercise of 
deduction. Think about the identification of what specific liberties should be protected under a general principle 
demanding equal civil and political liberties. 
 A final clarification. Evaluative judgments are not contingent upon the feasibility of what they recommend, but 
they may be sensitive to certain facts. Fundamental evaluative principles identify ideals we should strive for. But 
their content encodes normative responses to valuable features of human beings (or other entities). Thus, principles 
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 We use evaluative judgments to compare the intrinsic moral desirability of various states of 
affairs. To do so, we neutralize consideration of feasibility by assuming that we have the power 
to bring them all about. We can further assume that the probability of our reaching the outcomes 
if we seek them is 1 (the maximum). For example, we can compare three distributive 
arrangements in which income accrues to workers in the context of (a) a highly de-regulated 
competitive economy; (b) an economy where there is competition for jobs but where there are 
mechanisms securing that those who come from economically poorer backgrounds get support to 
develop their talents (e.g. via excellent public education); and (c) an economy in which, in 
addition to the measures in (b), the wages of the less talented are supplemented. If we endorse 
luck-egalitarianism (the view that it is unfair for some to be worse-off than others through no 
choice or fault of their own), we would judge that (c) is superior to (b) and that (b) is superior to 
(a). This judgment is not contingent upon feasibility parameters.  
 On the other hand, we use prescriptive judgments to identify what we should do once we 
factor in actual feasibility. For example, if only (a) and (b) are feasible, then it is (b), not (c), that 
we should go for. The two kinds of judgments involve two different senses of the idea of 
injustice. In the first, there is an injustice whenever the state of affairs that occurs is not among 
the morally best. In the second, there is an injustice when agents (or agent-controlled institutions) 
fail to bring about a morally desirable state of affairs they could (and ought to, in the prescriptive 
sense) bring about.12 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of liberty may be responsive to the fact that human beings are capable of autonomous judgment. (On the view that 
fundamental normative principles “reflect,” or as state how to appropriately “respond” to certain features of human 
beings—or other entities—see Kagan 1998: sect. 7.4.) Consequently, although I agree with Hamlin and 
Stemplowska 2012: 51 that there is a useful contrast between a “theory of ideals” that identifies various feasibility-
independent principles and a continuum between “ideal” and “nonideal theory” that handles their application once 
considerations of feasibility are brought in, I think that this contrast cannot fully account for the relation between 
facts and principles. Some forms of fact-sensitivity go beyond issues of feasibility. 
12 The two cases can come apart. The presence of (b) and the absence of (c) could involve an injustice from the 
evaluative standpoint but not from the prescriptive standpoint. Both senses are worth retaining. Definitions of justice 
 12 
 Both kinds of judgments are crucial. The importance of prescriptive judgments is obvious: 
they provide a straightforward basis for deciding what to do. But evaluative judgments have 
several important roles. Here are four. First, they help us develop the right attitude and demeanor 
towards others. The evaluative judgment that (c) is the best state of affairs would give us reason 
to approach interpersonal relations under (b) in an appropriate way. The better-off should be 
somewhat circumspect, and show humility, in their interaction with the worse-off. The 
inequality, given that (c) is not feasible, may simply be the result of the natural lottery. Second, if 
we cannot achieve the best outcome in our evaluative rankings, the rankings may help us choose 
among the remaining outcomes that are feasible. The ranking (c)>(b)>(a) helps us choose 
between (b) and (a) when (c) is infeasible. Third, keeping this ranking in mind helps if the 
infeasibility of (c) is temporary. In the future (c) may become feasible. We will then be ready to 
straightaway go for (c). Finally, (c) may be such that it will become feasible (or more feasible) in 
the future if we take certain steps in the present to make it so. By keeping (c) in view, we will be 
on the look for the relevant steps to make (c) accessible. The strategy I propose in section 3 
exploits these points at different levels of reasoning in the pursuit of justice. 
 Notice that by engaging in both evaluative and prescriptive considerations, and by connecting 
them, we service the intuitions springing from the ethical sense of responsibility and care for the 
results of our actions (see 2.2). If we only focused on evaluative judgments we would risk naive 
idealism. If we only focused on our immediate prescriptive judgments, we would risk 
conservative realism. If, instead, we engage in both kinds of judgments and explore their 
                                                                                                                                                                           
that range only over states of affairs, or only over feasible actions, would miss part of the picture. An example of the 
former occurs in Gheaus 2013: 448. Disconnecting justice from feasibility has the advantage of unshackling our 
exploration of ambitious normative views. The risk is failure to illuminate how they shape our reasoning about what 
to do in the real world when feasibility is factored in (as eventually it must). Keeping the distinction between 
evaluations and prescriptions while seeing both as relevant for justice allows us to be normatively ambitious and 
practically lucid. Our ethical sense of responsibility requires both. (I do not claim that Gheaus’s account is false, but 
that it is incomplete: it does not address—although it does not exclude—the prescriptive sense of injustice.) 
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relations, we can combine normative ambition and political realism, and enable ourselves to 
choose the best strategies of action for the present and the future. As we do this, we take soft 
constraints seriously, but also consider whether to go against them (which is, as we will see, a 
choice we should sometimes make.) 
 The second key, enabling distinction is more familiar, and can be presented succinctly. It is 
the distinction between pro tanto and all-things-considered judgments. A pro tanto judgment that 
we ought to do A is not final. To identify what, conclusively, we ought to do in certain 
circumstances C, we must factor in feasibility considerations and the full palette of pro tanto 
judgments that bear on the choice in C. Prescriptions are all-things-considered judgments, the 
result of the balancing of various considerations. Thus, there is much debate amongst political 
philosophers as to whether we should, all-things-considered, go for (c) (i.e. what luck-
egalitarianism demands).13 (c) might be infeasible because we have no epistemic access to the 
differences in people’s natural talents, or to how they affect productive output. Alternatively, this 
knowledge might be accessible, but to get it we would have to force people to engage in 
“shameful revelations,” or use it to make public decisions that would be humiliating to those 
deemed to have “inferior” native talents. Obviously, what is happening here is that in addition to 
the pro tanto judgment about fairness supporting luck-egalitarianism, we may hold other 
commitments regarding liberty, privacy, respect, etc., which, given feasibility considerations, 
may lead to conflicting demands. So to move from evaluations along different axes of appraisal 
to prescriptions about what to do in certain circumstances we need to balance various pro tanto 
judgments, given feasibility considerations, to reach all-things-considered judgments. I will say 
more about this below. But it is important that recognizing this complexity does not debunk the 
                                                      
13 For the challenges see Anderson 1999 and Wolff 1998. Responders acknowledge the tensions, and emphasize the 
pro tanto nature of luck-egalitarianism (Cohen 2008: 7-8, 271; Gilabert 2012c; Swift 2008: 382-7). Egalitarians can 
be pluralist about normative grounds (Temkin 2009: 155-78). For epistemic issues involved see Herzog 2013: 279. 
 14 
importance of making evaluative judgments that do not depend on feasibility. We would not be 
fully alive to this complexity without them. They identify the relevant ideals that make the cases 
complex. And the complexity is morally engaging and the resulting conflicts tortuous because 
the evaluative judgments track important reasons of justice. 
 Let me illustrate the significance of the distinctions made in this section by considering an 
interesting type of cases for practical judgment. Here agents have to determine whether to pursue 
a path leading to a morally desirable outcome when its achievement collides with soft but not 
with hard feasibility obstacles. This situation of choice may be hard to deal with.  Recall Celeste. 
She has reason to choose to stay as leader (she could perform at her best and help achieve more 
social justice than Delia). She also has reason to step down (she could, and in fact is likely to, 
become corrupted and help achieve less social justice than Delia). What should be her choice, 
all-things-considered?  
 My intuitions are in tension here. On the one hand, I want to avoid an approach that lets 
agents off the hook and is too deferential to the status quo that is morally rotten. That people will 
not do something that is morally desirable, or have a very low probability of success even if they 
try, is not something that can simply dissolve a duty to do it. Only strict inability would have that 
upshot. Celeste could succeed. She ought to go for it. On the other hand, choosing to do 
something when one is unlikely to, or will not do it may be morally irresponsible. One should be 
mindful of the harm one may cause, or fail to avert. Predictably, Delia will go further in the 
pursuit of social justice than Celeste. Celeste ought to get out of the way.  
 How can we address this situation, in which two conflicting moral conclusions seem 
warranted: (i) Celeste ought to choose to stay as leader, and (ii) Celeste ought to choose to step 
down? It would not do to say that (i) is superior to (ii) because it honors moral reasons. Even if 
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moral reasons are decisive in practical reasoning, (i) need not win. This is because (ii) is also 
backed by moral reasons. The worry about irresponsibility is a worry about harm or failure to 
bring about what is right (in this case, social justice).  
 It is also relevant in this situation that we are not only considering an act, but also an initial 
choice, a subsequent set of acts, and a certain final outcome. The possibility of failure arises if 
one chooses to act in a certain way, does some of the necessary acts but not all, and the final 
outcome fails to materialize. Things would be less complicated if the issue was whether to bring 
about the final outcome by just pressing a button when one already has a finger on it and could 
just press it. Extended processes (such as Celeste’s activities as leader of the party) include 
numerous occasions for the agent’s will to weaken or lose the right orientation. 
 An interesting phenomenon here concerns the adoption, by the agent engaging in deliberation, 
of two perspectives. When Celeste selects (i) she mainly sees herself from the first-person 
perspective, as a free agent. When she selects (ii) she hesitates, steps back and sees herself as it 
were from sideways and predicts that she will fail to achieve the outcome if she chooses to 
pursue it. There is something troublesome, morally speaking, about the third-personal detour. 
She can do it after all. Seeing oneself as a stone helplessly falling from a cliff seems both 
inaccurate and morally faulty. It is up to her to try hard and avoid corruption, isn’t it? And yet, 
one’s will is not all-powerful. It would also be a failure of self-knowledge not to notice one’s 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Celeste may still act freely when she chooses (ii). But she does 
so in a way that takes notice of how free choice (if there is such a thing) is surrounded by 
obstacles and risks such that it may fail to hit its favorite targets.14 
                                                      
14 In our interactions, we take a double perspective. We expect others to sometimes act rationally, and to sometimes 
be overwhelmed by physical or emotional forces. We often approach ourselves this way. Given these expectations, it 
is rational to organize our lives by providing ourselves with strategies to respond in cases in which we act 
irrationally. This kind of meta-rationality at the prudential level has use for moral purposes. One reason why we 
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 Even if the right choice, all-things-considered, were not to try to bring about the evaluatively 
best final outcome, agents would not be off the hook. First, they should feel regret or remorse 
when not going for that outcome. Second, they could train themselves to become better persons 
who are more likely to follow through in the pursuit of the right goals. Third, they could reshape 
their circumstances to make this pursuit easier in the future. Thus, Celeste could choose to step 
down, but also seek help to strengthen her resolution to avoid corruption, and work to change the 
internal rules of her party and of the political system more widely to dis-incentivize corruption. 
This choice to change feasibility prospects over time involves the kind of attitude a dynamic 
approach to justice seeks to articulate. I turn now to developing this approach. 
 
3. The pursuit of justice: a dynamic approach 
How should evaluative and feasibility considerations interact in the pursuit of justice? How can 
this interaction proceed in a way that normative ambition and political realism are both catered 
for in a responsible way? This section answers these questions, developing a dynamic approach 
to the relation between justice and feasibility. 
 
3.1.  Three dimensions of a conception of justice and deliberative reflective equilibrium 
The first step in the development of the dynamic approach consists in explaining, in a systematic 
way, how normative desirability and feasibility interact at different levels of deliberation about 
the pursuit of social justice.  
If we seek to articulate a conception of social justice that can guide political practice, then 
we have reason to identify demands that are both normatively desirable and feasible.15 We are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
accept coercive backing of just laws is to provide ourselves with extra, prudential reasons to do what we have moral 
reason to do. 
15 Goodin and Pettit 1995: 1. 
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aiming at identifying all-things-considered prescriptions whose fulfillment would produce the 
expectably best results given our best efforts of inquiry about what is desirable and feasible. How 
can we go about pursuing such a target? We can proceed by seeking a maximally satisfactory 
combination of truths about desirability and feasibility for each of the different dimensions of a 
conception of justice. These dimensions involve normative claims about: 
DI: Core principles—including evaluative principles (DIa) and prescriptive principles (DIb). 
DII: Institutions and social practices.  
DIII: Processes of transformation. 
Once our conception is worked out, the contents of DIII logically depend on the contents of DII, 
which in turn depend on the contents of DI. We demand institutions and social practices that 
implement our core principles, and strategies of reform that lead agents from where they are to a 
social situation in which the appropriate institutions and practices are in place. As we move from 
one dimension to the next, we decrease the level of abstraction, and entertain desirable 
specifications and applications of the demands of previous dimensions in more circumscribed 
circumstances. Binary feasibility concerning hard constraints is of course relevant for all three 
dimensions, but as we will see considerations of scalar feasibility addressing soft constraints 
involve important variations. 
  I will state the targets for each dimension and illustrate them by using elements of Rawls’s 
familiar theory of social justice.16 At DI, we identify a set of pro tanto evaluative principles (DIa) 
and formulate the prescriptive combinations of them (DIb) that are most appropriate for the 
                                                      
16 See Rawls 1999: 266 (for the two principles), sect. 22 (on the “circumstances of justice”), and sect. 77 (on the 
capacities of rationality and reasonability as the “basis of equality”). I use Rawls’s theory for illustration purposes. 
Alternative interpretations are of course possible. What follows revises the statements in Gilabert 2008: 412-4, 
2012b: 122-4; and Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012: 819-21. DI is reformulated by addressing DIa and DIb, the 
“circumstances of justice” are characterized differently, and the relations between DI, DII, and DIII are explored 
further. 
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range of social contexts we wish to address (which may be fairly wide). Take Rawls’s two 
principles of justice, the first demanding an extensive set of equal civil and political liberties and 
the second requiring economic distributions that maximize the prospects of the worst-off against 
a background of fair equality of opportunity. They constitute a prescriptive package (with the 
first having priority over the second) that balances various evaluative ideals concerning equality, 
liberty, efficiency, and reciprocity. These ideals involve pro tanto principles that respond to 
general features of human beings such as their rationality and reasonability (i.e., their capacities 
to form, revise and pursue conceptions of the good life, and to impartially entertain and honor 
conceptions of what is right). Their articulation into a structured set of conclusive, prescriptive 
principles is sensitive to facts that make their fulfillment feasible, such as the “circumstances of 
justice” involving only moderate material scarcity and conflict of interests and certain relevant 
features of human psychology and social organization. The circumstances of justice involve soft 
constraints. In some periods of human history material scarcity was extreme rather than 
moderate, and it is not impossible that extreme scarcity may reappear in the future (e.g. as a 
result of massive climate change). The probability of achieving or of moving away from the 
circumstances of justice may vary. But Rawls’s prescriptive articulation of his principles takes 
them as fixed for modern contexts in the foreseeable future. The circumstances of justice thus 
operate, for all practical purposes in a certain subset of possible contexts, as a hard constraint.17 
 As we move to DII, we notice that there are various candidate social arrangements. The task 
is to identify some that are no worse than any alternative at implementing the principles from 
DIb in certain specific contexts. To do this, we engage again in considerations of desirability and 
                                                      
17  This is a case in which we could contextually identify probability thresholds regarding soft constraints, 
constructing binary feasibility claims out of scalar ones (see note 7). I do not deny that there are obligations of 
justice in situations of extreme scarcity. Besides dynamic duties to overcome them, agents may have other 
prescriptive principles to immediately fulfill. These prescriptions articulate evaluative pro tanto principles in ways 
that may differ from the articulations for circumstances of moderate scarcity. 
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feasibility. Social arrangements are desirable to the extent that they fulfill the principles from 
DIb. They are feasible to the extent that they are stable. A social arrangement is stable to the 
extent that once established it is likely to remain in place. (Stability contrasts with accessibility—
discussed below—which is paramount at DIII.18) For example, Rawls discusses five specific 
candidates for contemporary societies: property-owning democracy, liberal democratic 
socialism, laissez-faire capitalism, welfare state capitalism, and state socialism with a command 
economy.19 He argues (holding constant, it seems, some facts about the likely functioning of a 
modern economy) that only the first two are appropriate implementations of his two principles. 
This preference is based primarily on desirability considerations. Laissez-faire capitalism and 
welfare state capitalism would condone unacceptable levels of economic inequality and would 
not secure the fair value of citizens’ political freedom, while state socialism with a command 
economy would unacceptably limit civil and political liberties. 20  The choice between the 
remaining arrangements depends on scalar feasibility. The political culture of certain countries 
may make one more realistic than the other, and advocates should choose which one to pursue 
accordingly. For example, Americans are more likely to embrace property-owning democracy. 
 When we turn to DIII the task is to identify a trajectory of political change producing the 
social arrangements from DII that is all-things-considered reasonable. Again scalar feasibility 
and desirability considerations are necessary. Regarding feasibility, a social arrangement is 
                                                      
18 The accessibility question is “Can we move from here to there?” and the stability question is “Can we stay there?” 
(Cohen 2009: 56-7). The former is arguably also relevant for DII, as its prescriptions might be dented by difficulties 
in accessing what they demand. And stability at DII is relevant for DIII, as the decision to embark in a transition 
may be affected by beliefs about the stability of the destination. Furthermore, very general facts about human 
psychology may make some prescriptions at DIb unstable (e.g. Rawls 1999:119, 153-5, argues that utilitarianism 
leads to instability by demanding excessive self-sacrifice). This would differ from the more specific forms of 
instability arising from certain institutions in some specific situations at DII. 
19 Rawls 2001: 135-40. 
20 We can also criticize these three regimes on feasibility grounds. If people care enough about the liberty and 
equality these regimes depress, they might move away from them. Notice that this is different from a challenge on 
moral grounds. The latter is based on the actual moral costs of those regimes, while the former refers to believed 
moral costs. 
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accessible to the extent that agents are able to reach it from where they are. The desirability of a 
process of change depends on the moral appeal of its results (whether it turns out to be what DII 
calls for) and on the severity of the moral costs that it would involve. Dimension DIII is the least 
explored in political philosophy. Rawls had little to say about it, although he did emphasize the 
importance of combatting the “curse of money” in politics, which slants the political playing 
field so that it is very hard for poorer citizens to promote reforms leading to the regimes selected 
at DII. He also emphasized that we should use principles from DI to identify priorities, and 
measure moral costs, of the processes of reform in DIII.21  
 To summarize, the targets of each dimension of a conception of justice are the following. At 
DI, we select a prescriptive package (DIb) that is maximally satisfactory in terms of honoring 
fundamental pro tanto evaluative principles (DIa) given general facts about human beings and 
social organization and the societies we seek to regulate. At DII, we select a set of institutions 
and social practices that is maximally satisfactory at implementing the principles from DI in the 
set of specific contexts within the societies we are considering. At DIII, we select a process of 
political reform that is maximally satisfactory at reaching the social arrangements from DII 
without imposing unreasonable moral costs. Each target is the result of comparative judgments 
where alternatives are assessed in terms of feasibility and normative desirability.22 Of course, the 
inquiry tracking these targets is fallible. What we expect to have maximal normative value may 
not actually have it. We can (and should) revise our beliefs as we continue our inquiry. 
                                                      
21 E.g., if liberty has priority over other demands of justice, then we should take the establishment of liberties (and 
their fair value) as the first goal and pursue further reforms only if they do not collide with liberties if we can secure 
them (Rawls 1999: 132, 215-8). Rawls did not claim that the priority of liberty holds in all conceivable 
circumstances (p. 267). 
22 I phrase the targets in terms of what is maximally satisfactory (i.e. no worse than the alternatives) rather than in 
terms of what is optimal because we may sometimes be unable to rank certain options (e.g. two options may be 
equivalent in their overall normative value). To simplify my formulations, I sometimes talk about our “best” views 
regarding DI-DIII, but the reader should keep in mind that when the set of the best includes more than one view we 
should revert to the “maximizing” formulation. 
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 There is a gaping hole in political philosophy when it comes to DIII. I will take steps to fill it 
in section 3.2. But before proceeding, let me characterize the methodology for the articulation of 
the three dimensions. Since it shapes the deliberation of acting agents, this methodology is also 
an essential aspect of the dynamic approach to justice and feasibility. 
 The foregoing presentation might make it seem that the inquiry into the components of a 
conception of justice is strictly sequential, that one first fixes the contents of DI and only then 
proceeds to DII, and that one fixes the contents of DII and only then turns to DIII. In epistemic 
practice things are more complicated. The development of a conception of DI-DIII is a matter of 
fallible, ongoing search for deliberative reflective equilibrium. This means, first, that the content 
of each dimension is open to change by considering its relation with the contents of the other 
dimensions. We already saw how variations at DII might respond to what results at DI, and how 
changes in DIII may be guided by results both at DI and DII. But notice that changes can also 
proceed in the opposite direction. We may wish to revise the principles at DI as a result of our 
inquiry at DII. Libertarians could revise their sweeping prescriptions regarding economic liberty 
after noticing that limiting some economic liberties of owners of capital is crucial to realistically 
secure effective political freedom for all at DII (a value they may already hold, or have come to 
accept). Changes at DI and DII may result from consideration of issues regarding DIII. Socialists 
could add explicit requirements of civil and political liberty to their view of DI and to their 
institutional designs at DII after exploring undesirable consequences of some of their historical 
experiments in which those liberties were trampled with. Anarchist might revise their criticisms 
of democratic political theory and practice when they notice that creating a political organization 
of society that includes no coercive mechanisms has an extremely low score of scalar feasibility. 
Thus, we have reason to pursue an ongoing inquiry in which changes at each level may motivate 
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changes at other levels. We should be open to successive revisions yielding successive reflective 
equilibria.23 
 Second, the reflective equilibrium we should aim at is “deliberative” in two senses. To begin 
with, it is not a description of our existing beliefs, but an attempt to form and integrate the best 
we can muster. We are not merely trying to make explicit what we already believe to be feasible 
or desirable. We are trying to determine what to believe.24  Further, we should ideally seek a 
reflective equilibrium that is intersubjective, involving various agents for whom the issues at 
stake are relevant. This includes, of course, political agents on the ground. But it could also 
include social scientists undertaking feasibility assessments, philosophers of science reflecting 
on how those assessments are methodologically framed, and political philosophers articulating 
core concepts and principles of justice. This intersubjective pursuit is difficult, and often 
missing.25 It is difficult because the parties may have different practical exigencies, use different 
methods, and be unfamiliar with each other’s activities. But these are not reasons to avoid the 
                                                      
23 “The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our considered judgments (some 
say our ‘intuitions’) about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the 
theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, 
revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among them.” 
Daniels 2011. 
  My account of three dimensions of a conception of justice differs from Rawls’s (1999: sect. 31) “four-stage 
sequence” (including selection of principles, a constitution, legislation, and individual decisions). Both envision 
progression from more abstract to more specific prescriptive judgments. But there are differences. First, I do not 
present the characterization of DI-DIII as working within the thought-experiment of the original position. Second, 
Rawls’s sequence has no explicit place for the issue of accessibility. Third, I emphasize the epistemic back-and-forth 
when determining what to accept as the content of each dimension. I note, however, that Rawls is not always 
consistent. When he introduces the four-stage sequence, he says that what is figured out at each stage coming after 
the first “inherits” the results of earlier stages (it must be consistent with the latter, and apply their results to more 
specific circumstances) (p. 175-6). But at one point (p. 174) Rawls says that we will find the “best constitution” by 
“[m]oving back and forth between the stages of the constitutional convention and the legislature.” This is 
incompatible with a strictly sequential view. I think that on reflection Rawls would agree with a not strictly 
sequential view of the relation between the stages in the order of knowledge given that for him reflective 
equilibrium is the ultimate epistemic test.  
  To avoid misunderstanding, I note that when I talk about a back-and-forth I focus on the order of knowledge. There 
is a sense in which I agree that there is a strict sequence. As I say at the beginning of this section, when an overall 
conception has been settled, the final product has to exhibit a logical sequence: DIb articulates the evaluative 
principles of DIa into a prescriptive package, DII implements the principles of DIb, and DIII targets the process that 
generates what DII demands.  
24Scanlon 2003. 
25 Herzog 2013: 284. 
 23 
intersubjective exercises. We need them for at least two reasons. One is epistemic. Each party 
has something to contribute which the others are unlikely to provide on their own in the most 
satisfactory way. Political philosophers are not particularly good at making feasibility 
assessments, and would thus profit from interaction with social scientists when it comes to the 
identification of appropriate institutional proposals. Philosophers can be provoked by political 
actors to formulate conceptual and normative questions that have real political significance. 
Social scientists may benefit from normative theories and political agents on the ground to 
formulate questions of research that are interesting rather than trivial. They may also need help 
from philosophers to articulate their core concepts in perspicuous ways, and to gain awareness of 
the epistemological strengths and limitations of their research. Citizens and activists on the 
ground would also profit from the work by philosophers and scientists. Arguably that work is a 
technical continuation of inquiries they already engage in when they wonder about what makes 
their situation unjust, what ideals to strive for, and what are some reasonably feasible ways to act 
in a complex social world where causal mechanisms are not always transparent. These 
cooperative exercises are also important for normative reasons. We should shape our politics 
democratically. It is important that the agents who will endure the consequences of important 
political decisions are able to have a say on them. To do this they need (inter alia) real 
opportunities to form lucid opinions on the matters at stake. 
 I do not want to give the impression that the difficulties in reaching deliberative reflective 
equilibrium are not serious. A source of difficulty is the increasing fragmentation, both at the 
epistemic level (within and between groups of social scientists, philosophers, policy makers, etc.) 
and at the political level (e.g. between citizens, political parties and leaders, and bureaucrats). On 
the other hand, successful interactions have existed and can be fostered. I also do not want to 
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overestimate the value of actual agreement amongst those involved in the plural conversations 
aiming at reflective equilibrium. Sometimes the best contribution will be one that undermines 
agreement in the short-term. To illustrate, new social movements often formulate new grievances 
that are not in the radar of mainstream philosophical and scientific research, but help reshape 
them. Think about the consequences of working-class and feminist movements, and, more 
recently, the revival of discussion on inequality sparked by the Occupy movement in 2011. 
Another example is when some philosophers stubbornly insist that ambitious ideals of justice be 
explored even when the feasibility prospects for their implementation in the here and now seem 
low. It is part of the job of political philosophy to keep ambitious ideals clear and visible, and to 
criticize a political culture when it becomes complacent and superficial. In 3.2 I will unpack the 
importance of these forms of insistence. 
 A third way in which reflective equilibrium regarding DI-DIII may be deliberative is that it is 
related to how each of us, as political agents, decides to act. A problem here is that there may be 
multiple reflective equilibria held by different people. There may be no theoretical solution to 
this problem. Each has to act in the social world, and each will have to do it on whatever balance 
of reasons seems best to them after inquiry. We can hope for, seek, and achieve more 
convergence. But it may not materialize in time. There may be a meta-feasibility issue here. As 
we choose how to act, we may have to think about the feasibility of our converging on our 
normative and descriptive views, and determine the significance of the results in our overall 
practical reasoning. The deliberative nature of the reflective equilibrium leading to choice is 
basic in the sense that we cannot unload the task to others.26 
 
                                                      
26 Even philosophers and scientists have to act as political agents. They can shape philosophical and scientific work 
so that it illuminates the choices of political agents. In this way, philosophers and scientists can retrace their 
activities to the aim of illuminating the praxis of changing the social world to make it more just. 
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3.2. Transitional standpoint, political imagination, and dynamic duties 
 
3.2.1. Transitional standpoint 
After identifying the dimensions of a conception of justice, their relations, and the methodology 
of their articulation and revision, I proceed to explain the features of the dynamic approach that 
directly orient political action in a way that enables us both to remain ambitious in our normative 
aims and to think lucidly about what practical steps to take. The first move is the adoption of a 
transitional standpoint. This is the standpoint of political agents in the process of changing 
central features of the institutional and cultural environment in which they act. It involves 
envisaging paths of action from the status quo to social arrangements in which principles of 
justice are fulfilled. What should happen at DIII is that political agents entertain trajectories of 
political reform such that social arrangements are (more or less suddenly, more or less gradually) 
transformed to reach the implementation of the principles envisaged at DII.  
As we will see, various considerations are relevant from this perspective. But it is crucial to 
remember that these are increasingly specific as we move form DI to DII, and from DII to DIII. 
As we move from one dimension to the next the agents, actions, and circumstances of our 
political considerations become more circumscribed spatially and temporally.  
Once the transitional standpoint is taken, the dynamic approach involves two further practical 
features. First, no single failure at DII is sufficient to warrant dropping the principles from DI. 
We can imagine alternative social configurations that do implement the principles. Second, no 
temporary inability at DIII to achieve the implementations envisaged for DII warrants their 
abandonment as political aims. We can entertain successive steps that expand our feasible sets of 
political action over time so as to eventually access the implementations envisaged. DI sets a 
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wide and long-term political horizon for DII and DIII. In what follows I explore these two key 
moves involving, respectively, political imagination and dynamic duties.27 
 
3.2.2. Political imagination 
It is important to keep in mind the distinction between DI and DII, and to recall that the task of 
DII is to find a way to implement the evaluative and prescriptive principles of DI in a certain 
context. These points might sound obvious, but political theory and practice is awash with 
failures to honor them. There is a tendency to fetishize certain institutional proposals, taking the 
truth or relevance of the underlying principles of justice to be tied to their success. Sometimes 
the overall conception is simply identified with what it says at DII, with DI dropping out of view. 
This impoverishes political debate and unduly narrows our practical options. Some 
implementation of a prescriptive principle must work (on desirability and feasibility grounds) for 
that principle to be successful (as a prescriptive principle), but we cannot infer that the principle 
fails when any single implementation does not work. A typical example occurs in the socialist 
tradition, with its fixation on construing the socialist ideal in terms of state control of productive 
assets. Many historical experiments involved high levels of inefficiency (given the deficiencies 
of states’ agencies when gathering and processing information about supply and demand in a 
complex modern economy), and also worrisome limitations of citizens’ ability to control the 
economic and political processes (given extensive centralization of decision-making in the hands 
of a bureaucratic elite). It is common to hear that the socialist ideal is dead because a centrally 
planned economy is inefficient and oppressive. 
                                                      
27  The dynamic approach has an important consequence for the debate between ideal and nonideal theory: it 
vindicates ambitious principles as important for DI, and thus as framing the content of DII and DIII. 
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 But we should explore the possibilities opened up by the fact that there are different levels of 
generality within normative political judgment. We can use our political imagination to envisage 
alternative specifications at DII of the principles of DI. If we find a candidate at DII wanting (for 
feasibility or desirability reasons), then we can move up to DI and then back down to DII by 
imagining alternative implementations of the principles. This argumentative triangulation helps 
us distance ourselves from problematic political proposals without having to drop the principles 
that ultimately should animate our political practice. Thus, instead of fetishizing a particular 
institutional design, socialists should notice that what animates their practice is a set of principles 
and imagine better ways to put them into practice. Arguably what motivate their critique of 
capitalism are their commitments to deep forms of equality, freedom, and solidarity. The 
institutions of central command socialism were problematic because they did not implement 
those ideals. Alternative designs are conceivable, such as market socialism, or the recent 
proposal by Joseph Carens, and they might work.28 
 Another problem that can be addressed through political imagination that is both attuned to 
ambitious principles and specific feasibility considerations is the tendency to take a social design 
that works in some context as valid for every other context. There is room for political 
imagination at DII partly because the “circumstances of justice” of DIb can take (at DII and DIII) 
multiple more specific forms. We can call those “situations of justice.” Thus, as mentioned 
above, if indeed property-owning democracy is as good as liberal democratic socialism at 
fulfilling the principles of justice as fairness, then there is no loss in taking the former rather than 
the latter as the institutional objective in the American context. Things could be the opposite in 
                                                      
28 In market socialism, every citizen is initially provided with equal coupons they can use to get shares in firms. 
They cannot cash them to get money for consumption purposes, but they can get dividends from investing them. 
When they die, their coupons revert to the common pool for distribution to new generations. See Roemer 1994. In 
Carens’s proposal, markets are used to signal optimal intersections between the demand and supply of goods and 
services, but all incomes are taxed to equality. See Carens 2003. 
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many countries of Asia, Europe, or Latin America. If both designs are normatively equivalent as 
far as DIb is concerned, when in a certain situation we are finding it hard to implement one we 
may have reason to imagine and pursue the other. 
 As political agents, political philosophers, and social scientists envisage alternative feasible 
implementations of ambitious principles, they face ideological beliefs that clog the arteries of 
political imagination. These take some social configurations to be unavoidable, have 
transhistorical significance, or cater equally to the interest of all when they are in fact avoidable, 
of limited historical significance, and beneficial to some at the expense of others. Examples are 
the tendency to seek the indefinite accumulation of money (or some other economic means of 
exchange) and the tendency to construe self-respect as what results from winning in competitions 
for status positions. These operate as soft, not hard constraints. They are arguably contextually 
specific to capitalist societies. But they are commonly presented as fixed facts that any 
conception of social justice should accommodate or draw on. Thus, we are often told that we 
should accept some inequalities in rewards because they provide necessary incentives for highly 
talented or productive people to work hard. Now, it is obviously infeasible for everyone to be at 
the top and gain self-respect from being there (unless, implausibly, we could devise as many 
competitions as individuals), and we need not link expansion of productivity to inequality. 
Furthermore, we could imagine, and perhaps achieve, other forms of incentivizing talented 
people to develop and use their natural gifts. The self-realization that comes from the 
development and deployment of one’s abilities in challenging work, and the satisfaction of 
increasing the material opportunities of one’s fellow human beings, might be strong motivational 
forces. One could interpret the socialist principle “From each according to their abilities, to each 
according to needs” as including these ideas.  
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 These operations of political imagination are possible partly because those engaging in them 
accept principles that are more abstract than their implementations. This means that, despite 
some complaints about it, abstraction, when handled properly, is a positive tool in politics. We 
have reason to identify high-level values and facts when we track true and important features of 
human beings and their social life. They enable us not to get stuck when some of our specific 
designs do not work. Principles range over many possible implementations, and without having a 
clear view of the former we are unable to shift from one implementation to another in thought 
and thus fail to identify alternatives we could and should pursue in practice. When we adopt 
normative principles, we envision an ethical and political project. A political project is different 
from a program, or a plan. The latter involve specific designs of institutions and practices. A 
project does not formulate its own application. It provides, instead, the core guiding standards by 
reference to which the programs and plans are to be drawn up, and evaluated. 
 As I said, abstractions are valuable when properly handled. We would not handle them 
properly when we neglect facts about human beings and social organization that are significant 
for the desirability and feasibility of principles or their implementation. Let me illustrate this 
point by exploring further the socialist principle “From each according to their abilities, to each 
according to needs” (the Abilities/Needs Principle).29  
 This principle has been interpreted in many ways. On one interpretation, it merely describes, 
or predicts, a state of affairs in which the circumstances of justice have disappeared as a result of 
superabundance. On another interpretation, which I prefer, it is an evaluative principle that can 
be used to handle situations of moderate scarcity and conflict of interests in certain (prescriptive) 
                                                      
29 The principle was formulated in Marx 1978: 531. In contemporary debate the principle is often labeled the “Needs 
Principle.” I call it differently, adding reference to “Abilities,” to emphasize the often-neglected fact that it refers 
both to the demand and the supply side. It states rights to receive, but also, and in conjunction, duties to give. See 
Gilabert 2015. 
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ways.30 I think that the merit of this principle is that it foregrounds the importance of fair 
reciprocity, positive duties of solidarity, and meaningful work. Briefly, the key ideas are the 
following. In a just economy people contribute through productive activities if they can. Since 
productive abilities are partly based on unequal native endowments, the levels of productivity 
will differ. But if productive efforts are similar, receipt of income and other means for need 
satisfaction should be equal. Opportunities for meaningful work are important. Work can be 
meaningful in at least two ways. First, it is itself a satisfaction of needs when it involves 
development and actualization of workers’ abilities (e.g. for creative and cooperative problem-
solving). Second, it contributes instrumentally to the satisfaction of other needs by creating 
material goods that people can use and enjoy.31 Since any functioning economy that is not 
completely automated needs labor input, it should recruit it somehow. If, furthermore, human 
beings have a legitimate interest in meaningful work, then there is reason to make available to 
them forms of work that are meaningful. 
 Thus interpreted, the Abilities/Needs Principle assumes that human beings are interested in 
self-direction and self-improvement, that they can find self-direction and self-improvement in 
productive activities, that they have different native powers that affect their abilities to produce, 
and that they are profoundly vulnerable and dependent on the help of others to live flourishing 
lives. These are facts that call for normative responses, and set feasibility boundaries on 
principles and institutional and cultural configurations.32 When we pay attention to them, the 
socialist view becomes appealing, while other views turn out to be disappointing. For example, a 
view centered on radical independence that only prescribes negative duties not to depress the 
                                                      
30 For an overview of the debate see Kymlicka 2002: ch. 5.  
31  On the first point see Elster 1986: ch.3. The second involves socialism’s affirmation of positive duties of 
solidarity or, as Einstein 1949 puts it, “a sense of responsibility for [one’s] fellow men.” 
32 See note 11 for the various roles of facts. 
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opportunities of others to direct their own affairs and improve their own life conditions may then 
appear either undesirable or hardly feasible (or both). To neglect the features of human social life 
socialists insist on would be to engage in improper abstraction. 
 Finally, keeping in mind the distinction between DI and DII, and the internal complexity of 
DI, enable us to respond to the important charge that ambitious theories of justice that sketch 
pictures of the perfectly just society are of no help when choosing among immediately feasible 
alternatives, none of which is the perfectly just society envisaged. This charge has been recently 
pressed by Amartya Sen.  
 Sen anticipates the likely response that the picture of the perfect society could be useful to 
rank the immediately feasible ones through identifying their relative distance from it. A first 
problem with this response is that the imperfect societies may differ from the perfect one in 
different ways, and we may be unable to tell which way is more important. The second problem 
is that “descriptive closeness is not necessarily a guide to valuational proximity.” Sen illustrates 
this point with an analogy: “a person who prefers red wine to white wine may prefer either to a 
mixture of the two, even though the mixture is, in an obvious descriptive sense, closer to the 
preferred red wine than pure white wine would be”.33  
 Sen’s complaints lose force if we keep in mind the distinction and the relation between DI and 
DII. An ambitious theory of justice does not only seek to imagine maximally desirable social 
institutions and practices (at DII). It also seeks to identify the principles that make them desirable 
                                                      
33 Sen 2009: 16. This discussion touches upon the “problem of the second-best.” See Goodin 1995 and Swift 2008. 
Swift (pp. 372-8) also criticizes Sen for failing to pay attention to how normative principles affect relevant 
descriptions. Goodin (p. 53 n. 45) notes that the problem of how to choose when some of the items from the ideal 
package are unavailable resurfaces when dealing with principles. My comments on the complexity of DI partially 
address this issue by saying that evaluative principles (DIa) may help us choose between different packages of 
prescriptive principles (DIb). If the worry were reapplied to the set of fundamental evaluative principles, it is hard to 
think what could lie beyond them. Intuitive balancing seems all one can do then. And it is possible that the absence 
of an item of the preferred package forces us to reconsider what principles bear on our choice, and what their 
relative weight in the circumstances is.  
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(at DI). It is largely those principles that determine what “descriptive features” are relevant, and 
what comparative importance they have. In fact, descriptive proximity may be quite significant if 
the descriptive features we track are the relevant ones (or the most important ones in the 
exercise) given our valuational commitments. (Something similar happens as we judge wines; 
perhaps color is less important than consistency of taste.) 
 It is also important to notice the internal complexity of DI. It could be that a preferred 
prescriptive combination (at DIb) of pro tanto evaluative principles (from DIa) is not feasible to 
implement in some situation. To decide between the alternatives, we look for other combinations 
of the pro tanto principles appropriate to the situation. Thus the Abilities/Needs Principle may 
have different weight in different situations, and may have to be combined with other principles 
(e.g. with a principle of free choice of occupation to make sure that the demand for meaningful 
work is a matter of opportunity rather than forced activity). Evaluative principles help us 
articulate the appropriate prescriptive principles given general feasibility considerations, and the 
latter help us select social institutions and practices given more specific feasibility 
considerations. If we look behind the perfect instances to identify the (evaluative and 
prescriptive) principles animating them, we can remain normatively ambitious. It is true that it is 
difficult to rank different axes of comparison. In justice as in other areas of practical reasoning 
we may lack a general algorithm. But the relation between DII and DI, and the internal 
complexity of DI, provide us with consequential resources.  
 
3.2.3. Dynamic duties 
In addition to the transitional standpoint and political imagination, the dynamic approach to 
justice and feasibility involves a third, crucial practical feature. According to the dynamic 
approach, we should focus not only on what is immediately feasible, but also on the long-term 
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and on our role in shaping it. 34  Perhaps perfect (or significantly less imperfect) social 
arrangements may turn out to be (more) feasible in the future. Focusing only on immediate 
feasibility may lead us to miss the point that our abilities for political action, involving soft rather 
than hard constraints, are open to temporal variation. What is not feasible (or has very low 
feasibility) now may become feasible (or be significantly more feasible) in the future if we take 
some steps to expand our political abilities. Consider this chart: 
                    Q 
 
P                                                               R 
 
 
                          S 
 
Make the following assumptions. R is the perfect outcome. From the status quo P, R is not 
immediately feasible. The two immediately feasible options from P are Q and S. S is intrinsically 
more desirable than Q. R would not be immediately feasible from S, but it would from Q. (To 
make formulations less cumbersome, here and in what follows I sometimes use binary phrasing 
for feasibility claims, but the reader should remember that scalar claims can and often should be 
made as well.) What should one choose? If one focuses only on the immediately feasible at P, 
then S should be chosen. But if one also factors in the long-term, then Q may be all-things-
considered preferable. Thus, imagine that Celeste has to choose whether to form an alliance with 
a less progressive party for the coming elections. If she does, the alliance will win the election 
and go some way towards implementing policies of social justice; but since in the alliance the 
other party will be dominant, the political agenda will be so shaped that deeper reforms will 
become very unlikely for the foreseeable future. If instead she decides not to join the alliance, 
concentrate on extending the increasing reach of her party, wait until the next election and, let us 
                                                      
34 This provides a further response to the challenge by Sen mentioned in 3.2.2. 
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assume, an alliance in that election will be under her party’s hegemony, then again an election 
win is likely but much deeper reforms will be undertaken. To make a responsible choice, Celeste 
has reason to look beyond what is immediately feasible. 
 So when we face soft constraints, we should explore their temporal variation. Celeste’s party 
can work to reshape the political culture in its country and become a stronger force for social 
change. In general, we may have what I call dynamic duties. Unlike normal duties, dynamic 
duties are not focused on achieving certain desirable outcomes within current circumstances. 
Their point is to change those circumstances so that certain desirable outcomes become 
achievable (or more achievable). Thus, dynamic duties direct a change, often an expansion, of an 
agent’s power to bring about certain outcomes.35 Power can in general be defined as follows: In 
certain circumstances C, an agent A has power with respect to whether some outcome O occurs 
to the extent that A can voluntarily determine whether O occurs. Now, dynamic duties involve a 
companion form of dynamic power, which we can define thus: A has dynamic power over A’s 
power with respect to whether some outcome O occurs to the extent that A can, in current 
circumstances C1, voluntarily determine whether C1 change into different circumstances C2 so 
that A becomes more (or less) able to voluntarily determine whether O occurs.36 
                                                      
35 I say “often” because one could also entertain dynamic duties to reduce one’s power to do certain things. 
Sometimes one may have a duty to make oneself less powerful. The elimination of nuclear arsenals may be an 
example. In this paper I focus on the case of expansion (i.e. empowerment). 
36 We can add time indices, and talk about A having power at time t1 with respect to O in tn, where tn coincides 
with, or comes later than, t1, and A acts in that period (Goldman 1986: 160-1). Economists explicitly use the idea of 
expanding feasible sets (e.g. Sen 2009: 384). For the more general idea of change in potentialities or abilities see 
Vetter 2013: 11-2. 
 Notice that my claims about dynamic duties to change a feasible set assume that the actions populating it are 
relative to agents placed in certain circumstances. Consider this scenario: in circumstances C1, A is not able to do X, 
in C2 A is able to do X, in C1 A is able to do Y to change C1 into C2. In a circumstances-relative sense of 
feasibility, A’s feasible set in C2 is different from A’s feasible set in C1 (X is included in C2 but not in C1). Now, A 
has control as to whether C2 comes about. It is perfectly intuitive to say that by doing Y in C1, A generates an 
ability to do (in C2) something (X) A was not able to do before (in C1). Someone may challenge this 
characterization by appealing to another according to which the feasible set is fixed at the outset. On this view, at the 
outset it is already feasible for A to do X later if A first takes appropriate means (does Y). I agree that this 
characterization is intuitive as well. Ordinarily, we talk both about developing new abilities and about the ability to 
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 Within a conception of justice, dynamic duties come into play at DIII, when we consider how 
to generate the social institutions and practices that we prefer at DII. This is the issue of 
accessibility of a just society, which is different from its stability. Although there has been some 
work in political philosophy on stability, accessibility has been largely ignored. But accessibility 
cannot be ignored when we adopt a transitional standpoint, which we must adopt to fully assess 
proposals for social change. There are some issues that are relevant to both stability and 
accessibility, such as motivational problems regarding free-riding, but their treatment would 
differ. For example, a society implementing the Abilities/Needs Principle might be stable in 
dealing with free-riding by socializing its people into a strong ethos of solidarity and by 
imposing financial penalties on non-compliance. But when it comes to accessibility those 
mechanisms will not yet be in place, and different strategies would be appropriate. The relevant 
institutions and ethos must first be created. 
 At DIII, political agents consider what dynamic duties they have given their dynamic powers. 
They ask themselves what processes of transformation they (and their successors) should pursue 
to implement their principles from DI through successive social institutions and practices to 
eventually instantiate their long-term goal concerning DII. A historical example is workers 
mobilizing for their inclusion in the political system through expansion of the franchise and then, 
with their voting power, pressing for the realization of basic socioeconomic rights (regarding 
minimum pay, labor time, workplace safety, etc.). More ambitiously, some socialists, following 
Marx, have envisaged the trajectory toward full socialism as taking two phases. In the first, after 
some resources are put aside to secure the maintenance of economic infrastructure and satisfy 
                                                                                                                                                                           
achieve certain ends through certain means. The contrast is merely terminological. The approaches are compatible 
(taking means to an end may involve developing a new ability, so that the feasibility of the end is a function of this 
development). I highlight the first characterization to illuminate the substantive issues addressed in this paper 
(concerning empowerment and dynamic duties). 
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basic needs (e.g. regarding health care and education), distribution of access to consumption 
goods follows the so-called Principle of Contribution (“To each according to their contribution”). 
In the second, distribution is based on the Abilities/Needs Principle. This principle is 
evaluatively superior. But it is not feasible during the early stage of transition, as moral and 
political culture is still colored by bourgeois principles (such as the principle of exchange of 
commodities with equivalent value—which disadvantages workers with lower natural talents), 
and there is not yet enough material abundance. Introducing the less intrinsically desirable 
scheme first would, however, ease the transition away from capitalism (by delivering on its 
unfulfilled promise to reward on the basis of productive activity rather than class position) and 
toward more desirable distributive schemes (through incentives to increase productivity that 
would make distribution according to needs more viable and thus a lively option).37 
 Are large-scale sequential projects of this kind worth pursuing? If so, how should the required 
all-things-considered normative political judgments be framed? I don’t know whether an 
algorithmic decision procedure can be identified. But I will suggest four elements that help in 
forming those judgments.  
 First, we can adapt some guidelines from decision theory. For example, we can compute the 
expected value of alternative paths of transition (as well as the status quo) by considering their 
intrinsic desirability and probability of success and favor ones with maximal score. We can also 
factor in the moral costs and risks that the processes might incidentally produce. Thus, the 
sequence P-Q-R may not be a case of “one step forward, then another step forward.” Q may 
involve violations of basic civil or political rights. “One step backward, two step forward” is 
sometimes an unacceptable strategy that sacrifices the rights of some for the benefit of others (or 
                                                      
37 Marx 1978: 528-32. Another possibility is to envision a sequence with market socialism first and Carens’s 
proposal second (see note 28). The latter is arguably more desirable because it addresses inequalities resulting from 
different natural endowments, but it may be less immediately feasible. 
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the same people) in the future. Another difficulty is path-dependence: Q may be more likely to 
become self-replicating than to give way to R. Also, it could be that besides rendering R 
accessible, Q involves a serious probability of leading to T, a catastrophic outcome. If Q 
involved a form of economic growth that could unleash deep environmental destruction, then 
perhaps the standard of equal access to conditions for a flourishing life should be catered for in 
different ways. Failing this, perhaps S is after all the preferable alternative. We have reason to 
engage in prospective choice seeking to maximize expectable normative value, guiding ourselves 
by the normative standards from DI, and the aim of approximating the realization of the 
preferred social formation at DII. The full palette of options and ethically relevant issues would 
not even be visible without entertaining this ambitious normative project. 
 The foregoing considerations assume that we can assign probabilities to outcomes. But this of 
course is not always immediately achievable, in which case when comparing different paths of 
action we may have to appeal to other typical strategies of choice under uncertainty. For 
example, if the stakes are extremely high, a “maximin” rule selecting the path whose worst 
possible outcome is among the least bad may be appropriate. When the stakes are low, taking 
risks with a “maximax” rule selecting the path whose best possible outcome is among the highest 
may be appropriate. What we may not do if we are to make responsible choices is to simply 
ignore the future. 38  Uncertainty about the future is no reason to disregard it. Notice that 
uncertainty could also affect the status quo. We may be unable to ascertain whether the current 
social situation will endure into the future, and what moral costs it will involve. So omitting the 
envisioning of alternatives to the status quo may itself amount to choosing an uncertain path. 
Notice also, and this is the second main point I want to make, that epistemic limitations are 
                                                      
38 We should take seriously the worries captured in the famous Keynes’s (1923: 80) line that “in the long run we are 
all dead.” But we should also remember that in the long-term future generations are born. We owe them something. 
 38 
themselves soft constraints we may have dynamic duties to overcome. If we keep our aims high 
even when they are not immediately realizable, and imagine social realizations at DII that would 
implement our principles from DI, then we will approach the tasks of transformation at DIII in a 
more serious way. We can engage in social-scientific work to learn more about political history 
and the dynamics of social change. There are numerous examples of scientific research that was 
sparked by political debates and fed back into them to make alternatives less indeterminate.39 
 The two final points I want to make concern the problem (mentioned in 3.1) of incongruence 
between views held by different agents regarding what should be done. How should Celeste 
approach political agents who disagree with her proposals for social transformation? Should she 
argue from an internal point of view that builds only on what they already accept or should she 
adopt an external approach? The former may be motivationally more appealing but lead to less 
profound social transformations, while the latter may target deeper transformations but be less 
motivating. In response, I think that two moves are important. The first is to focus on situations 
of crisis. In those situations people are sometimes more open to envisaging deeper political 
projects. Their self-regarding interests are threatened by the status quo, and the normative 
principles they already hold dear are seriously underserved. Situations of crisis may also be such 
that people are more open to revise their normative commitments, and thus the external approach 
may get a hearing as well. For example, during a deep economic crisis, the positive duties of 
solidarity and fair reciprocity involved in the Abilities/Needs Principle may become appealing.  
                                                      
39 De Swaan 1988 reports how history and social science helped shape the introduction of the welfare state. Ostrom 
2009 explains how social science can help solve the “tragedy of the commons” in dealing with common-pool 
resources. Sen 2009 shows how social choice theory and normative political philosophy can shape anti-poverty 
development policy. Wright 2010 outlines how sociology can help identify feasible strategies for socialist 
transformations. I am not suggesting that social scientists and philosophers can provide fully detailed blueprints for 
action. I agree with Isaiah Berlin that in the end virtuous political agents “behave like artists who understand their 
medium” (Berlin 2000: 139). But, as Berlin would agree (see p. 140), we should avoid an artificial dilemma between 
comprehensive scientific planning and choices only based on personal hunches. Science and philosophy cannot 
provide the former, and the latter may be the output of erroneous prejudices and irresponsible indifference to 
genuinely illuminating research. 
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 The second move is to seek institutions and practices of egalitarian political empowerment. 
To see the importance of this, agents can take not only the first-personal and third-personal 
attitudes discussed above (see 2.3), but also a second-personal attitude in which they seek to 
generate conditions in which they can argue with each other and decide together in a fair and 
inclusive way. This is a desirable configuration of their dynamic power. If the principles at DI 
and the ideal social structures at DII involve deep democratic self-determination, then shaping 
the practices of political transformation at DIII in ways that include egalitarian political 
empowerment would begin to instantiate the change agents are aiming at. Additionally, although 
processes of transformation may involve painful choices where each option involves some loss, 
these are less troublesome if they are made by the ones having to live with their consequences. 
When we think about what we, together, should do to pursue justice, it is important that the “we” 
be inclusive, taking people as protagonist of their own political history. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper I proposed a program of inquiry about the relations between justice and feasibility. 
When we pursue justice, descriptive considerations about what we are like and what we are able 
to do are important. They trigger application of our principles of justice, they identify features of 
human beings that give rise to normative responses, and they illuminate our ability to implement 
them. Feasibility affects our power to change the social world to make it more just. We should 
pay attention to feasibility in order to make responsible choices. But we should distinguish 
evaluative claims of justice that focus on what we should do if were able to do whatever we 
prefer and prescriptive ones that focus on what we should do given what we actually are able to 
do. We should take the former as our ethical compass when we factor in descriptive claims to 
articulate the latter. Prescriptions of justice operate at different levels, with different feasibility 
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constraints. Principles involve more general constraints than their implementation, and the latter 
involve more general constraints than the strategies of reform leading to them. These differences 
are important to develop a dynamic approach to facts blocking the pursuit of justice. We can 
imagine alternative implementations of principles, and we may have dynamic duties to reshape 
feasibility constraints over time. When we adopt this dynamic approach, our deliberations about 
how to pursue justice take a long-term transitional standpoint in which we are both normatively 
ambitious and hard-nosed about the realities of social life. 
 The tension between the ideal and the real is typical of political practice. As I see it, the job of 
political philosophy is not to help us escape from this tension by focusing only on evaluative 
principles without paying attention to feasibility, or to dissolve it prematurely by tying principles 
to specific and changeable feasibility constraints. Instead, political philosophy should help us 
relate to this practical tension in a lucid, hopeful, and effective way. The dynamic approach to 
justice and feasibility that I propose offers a way to do this. It might be objected that it makes the 
best an enemy of the good, encouraging agents to rush for ideal projects that are likely to fail, 
only to then recoil from political action, turn apathetic, and fail to bring about less ambitious but 
valuable changes they could easily secure. But since the approach I propose has built into it an 
ethics of responsibility that factors in the probabilities that various strategies would succeed, this 
consequence is not encouraged. Furthermore, we should not make the good an enemy of the 
better, or even the best. We can aim high if we pay attention to how to get there.40 
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